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Note
Rebutting Binary Sanity: Ohio’s Opportunity to
Overturn Wilcox and Recognize Diminished Capacity
in Mentally Ill Defendants
Ashley L. Moore*
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, an Ohio jury convicted Moses J. Wilcox of
aggravated burglary and aggravated murder despite
hearing Dr. Ramos’s expert psychiatric testimony that
Wilcox had an I.Q. of sixty-eight, a mental age of twelve,
schizophrenia, and dyslexia; was psychotic though not
“mentally ill” under the law; and was “susceptible to
following the instructions of an authority figure.” 1
Counterintuitively, Wilcox’s array of mental and
intellectual disabilities did not protect him from the
prosecution’s assertion that he possessed the requisite
intent, or mens rea, for the charged crimes. He initially put
up a defense of insanity, 2 but his own expert witness, Dr.
* Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality Volume 7; Indiana
University Maurer School of Law, J.D. 2019; Cedarville University, B.A.
2014. Many thanks to Professor Joseph Hoffmann for his feedback and
guidance when this Note was still just a large collection of ideas; to the
members both past and present of the Indiana Journal of Law & Social
Equality for their diligent editing and cite-checking; and to my family and
friends for their invaluable support and encouragement. I dedicate this Note
to my sister, Alice Alexandra Moore, my greatest advocate and closest friend.
State v. Wilcox, No. 42897, 1981 WL 4959, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
The insanity test in Ohio has fluctuated in the last fifty years. Before 1969,
Ohio used the M’Naghten rule of insanity, which requires a defendant to
show they lacked the cognition to know right from wrong at the time of the
crime due to a mental defect. See M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 Cl. &
Fin. 200 (1843). While the M’Naghten rule also considers the defendant’s
ability to understand the nature of their actions, it does not take into account
volition, or a person’s inability to control their conduct even when cognition
might be present. See id. The American Law Institute’s version, on the other
hand, takes both cognition and volition into account. MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”). In 1969,
the Ohio Supreme Court expanded its insanity defense to include a volition
prong, stating, “In order to establish the defense of insanity, the accused
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that disease or other
1
2
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Ramos, defeated it when she testified that despite his
conditions, he was sane at the time of the crime. 3
Subsequently, Wilcox attempted to use the evidence of his
mental state to prove he did not have the capacity to form
the required intent, a defense based on the diminished
capacity doctrine. 4
However, the trial court rejected this defense and
ruled that Wilcox could not use Dr. Ramos’ testimony for
any purpose besides determining whether he was insane at
the time of the crime. 5 In the trial court’s opinion, the fact
that Wilcox was neither drunk nor legally insane excluded
from consideration any other form of diminished capacity. 6
The appellate court disagreed, 7 but the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed and upheld Wilcox’s conviction. 8
Maintaining a bright-line standard for sanity, the court
held that defendants may not use psychiatric evidence
short of insanity to negate mens rea or assert a partial
defect of his mind had so impaired his reason that, at the time of the criminal
act with which he is charged, either he did not know that such act was wrong
or he did not have the ability to refrain from doing that act.” State v. Staten,
N.E.2d 293, 299 (1969); see also State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Ohio
1982) (“While this standard is arguably less expansive than that espoused by
the drafters of the Model Penal Code, see Section 4.01, it is considerably more
flexible than the M’Naghten rule.”) (citation omitted). This test was in place
in 1980 when Wilcox went to trial. In 1997, Ohio adopted its current version
of the insanity defense, requiring that defendants prove that “at the time of
the commission of the offense, the person did not know, as a result of a severe
mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the person’s acts.” OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14) (West 2018). Because Ohio’s current insanity
defense allows only for a defendant’s lack of knowing the “wrongfulness” of
their actions—and not also the “nature” of their conduct, like the original
M’Naghten rule allowed—it is the most restrictive version of the insanity test
still held to be constitutional under Clark v. Arizona. 548 U.S. 735 (2006)
(ruling constitutional Arizona’s narrowing of its insanity test by removing the
question of whether a mental defect prevented a defendant from
understanding what they were doing at the time of the crime).
3 Wilcox, 1981 WL 4959, at *8.
4 See discussion infra Part I.
5 Wilcox, 1981 WL 4959, at *8.
6 Id. at *10.
7 Id. In a split decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District
relied on arguments from other cases at the time stating that a defendant’s
legal sanity does not preclude the defendant’s inability to form the statutorily
required intent. The appellate court declared that the trial court’s denial of
this defense was reversible error, echoing the Seventh Circuit’s position in a
similar case: “We are not prepared to say, as a matter of law, that the
psychiatric testimony offered could not have proven that the petitioner was
incapable of forming specific intent.” Id. at 10 (quoting Hughes v. Matthews,
576 F.2d 1250, 1259 (7th Cir. 1978)).
8 State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio 1982).
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responsibility defense. 9 Two premises lay the foundation for
the court’s analysis: (1) psychiatric evidence can be
confusing and untrustworthy and is therefore inadmissible
short of determining insanity; and (2) sanity itself is a
binary concept—a jury that fails to find a defendant insane
may consider the defendant entirely sane. 10 The court
reasoned that between the availability of the insanity
defense and the mitigation process in sentencing, the state
of Ohio already provided adequate safeguards for those
with mental health issues. 11
In August 2017, Harvard Law’s Fair Punishment
Project released a report about the twenty-six men thenscheduled for execution in Ohio, stating that at least one of
the following factors was true of each defendant at the time
they committed their crime: had a mental illness; had an
intellectual or cognitive disability or brain damage; had a
background of significant childhood trauma, including
extensive physical or sexual abuse; or were under the age of
twenty-one. 12 Specifically, the report noted that Ronald
Phillips—whom Ohio put to death in July 2017 after taking
a three-year hiatus from executions following a botched
lethal injection 13—“had the intellectual functioning of a
juvenile, had a father who sexually abused him, and grew
up a victim of and witness to unspeakable physical
abuse.” 14 Since the report’s release, Ohio has also executed
Gary Otte15, who committed his crime when he was just
Id. at 533. The diminished capacity doctrine encompasses two main
defenses, and though the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly rejected just one in
its holding, it also implicitly rejected the other in its dicta. See infra Part I.
10 See id. at 530. The court lays out several reasons for rejecting defenses of
diminished capacity, but they all stem from these two premises.
11 Id. at 527 (“Having satisfied ourselves that Ohio’s test for criminal
responsibility adequately safeguards the rights of the insane, we are
disinclined to adopt an alternative defense that could swallow up the insanity
defense and its attendant commitment provisions.”).
12 The Fair Punishment Project, New Report: Prisoners on Ohio’s Execution
List Defined by Intellectual Impairment, Mental Illness, Trauma, and Young
Age, FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT (Aug. 29, 2017), http://fairpunishment.org/
prisoners-on-ohios-execution-list/ [https://web.archive.org/web/2019111
7010805/http://fairpunishment.org/prisoners-on-ohios-execution-list/].
13 Eric Levenson & AnneClaire Stapleton, Ohio Carries Out First Execution
Since 2014, CNN (July 26, 2017, 3:19 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/26/us/ohio-execution-ronald-phillips/index.html.
14 The Fair Punishment Project, supra note 12.
15 Execution List 2017, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2019),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2017. In 2018, Ohio also executed
Robert Van Hook. Execution List 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2019),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2018. On February 19, 2019,
9

346

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[7:2

twenty years old. 16 According to the Fair Punishment
Project, Otte also suffered from chronic depression and had
“psychological problems, developmental delays, learning
disabilities, and was emotionally handicapped.” 17
The disproportionate number of Ohio death row
inmates with significant mental health issues is
incongruent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s assumption in
Wilcox that mentally ill defendants are sufficiently
protected by either the insanity defense or sentence
mitigation. Some Ohioans evidently agree—in February
2017, Ohio Senate Bill 40 and Ohio House Bill 81 were both
introduced to amend relevant sections of Ohio’s Revised
Code to exclude from capital sentencing any person
convicted of aggravated murder who can show they suffered
from a statutorily defined “serious mental illness” at the
time that they committed the crime. 18 Both bills are
currently in committee, though discussion in this Note is
limited to Senate Bill 40 (S.B. 40).
While capital defendants garner more public
attention than noncapital defendants like Wilcox, 19
noncapital defendants confront the exact same barriers to
justice when courts overlook their mental disorders and
attribute culpability where it could not have existed. In
2017, the U.S. Department of Justice released a special
report, based on data collected between February 2011 and
May 2012, stating that 14% of state and federal prisoners
following a ruling by U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael Merz that questioned
the constitutionality of Ohio’s execution method, see In re Ohio Execution
Protocol Litigation, No. 2:11-cv-1016, 2019 WL 244488 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14,
2019), Governor Mike DeWine announced a halt to further executions until
the state improves its lethal injection protocol. Laura A. Bischoff, Ohio Gov.
Mike DeWine Stops Executions, Wants New Protocol, DAYTON DAILY NEWS
(Feb 19, 2019), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/
state--regional-govt--politics/ohio-gov-mike-dewine-stops-executions-wantsnew-protocol/1CvQOUD9itSaRYz1FiTBsN/.
16 State v. Otte, 660 N.E.2d 711, 723 (Ohio 1996); see also The Fair
Punishment Project, supra note 12.
17 Id.
18 S.B. 40, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017),
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132SB-40 (proposing statutory definitions for “serious mental illnesses”); H.B.
81, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017), https://www.legislature.ohio.
gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132-HB-81.
19 Though his aggravated murder conviction would normally have rendered
him eligible for the death penalty, Wilcox’s trial came after Ohio’s original
death penalty statute was declared unconstitutional, Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978), and before the next iteration of Ohio’s death penalty statute
was enacted. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 528. Wilcox did, however, receive a life
sentence. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 524.

2019]

Rebutting Binary Sanity

347

and 26% of jail inmates experienced “serious psychological
distress.” 20 Though these statistics rely on self-reported
symptoms, the study also reported that “37% of prisoners
and 44% of jail inmates had been told in the past by a
mental health professional that they had a mental
disorder.” 21 Likewise, Ohio’s former Director of
Rehabilitation and Corrections, Gary Mohr, stated in 2015
that out of the 20,000 people entering the corrections
system each year, about 20% of them had diagnosed mental
illnesses that required treatment. 22
In short, the legal fiction of binary sanity means that
defendants who cannot succeed with an insanity defense 23
are considered entirely sane during the guilt phase of a
trial and are unable to present any psychiatric evidence to
show otherwise. Moreover, outside the context of the
insanity defense, the law has strictly separated the
concepts of sanity and intent, 24 almost always to the
detriment of the mentally ill. 25 So these defendants—with
mental impairments not significant enough to constitute
legal insanity, yet serious enough to impair their
rationality 26 and raise doubts about their ability to form the
JENNIFER BRONSON & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
NCJ 250612, INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY
PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011-12, at 3 tbl.1 (2017),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/imhprpji1112.pdf.
21 Id.
22 Karen Kasler, Prisons Now Largest Mental Health Provider in Ohio, OHIO
PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.wyso.org/post/prisons-now-largestmental-health-provider-ohio.
23 See discussion supra note 2.
24 See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no
necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental
elements of the crime.”); see also State v. Curry, 543 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Ohio
1989) (“While it is true that a legally insane defendant may lack the capacity
to form the specific intent to commit a crime, criminal intent or lack thereof is
not the focus of the insanity question.”).
25 See Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 378 (1994)
(arguing that capital murder statutes effectively turn certain forms of
aggravated murder into strict liability crimes by shifting the sentencing
authority’s focus from deciding on mens rea to pointing out external
aggravating factors); Fredrick E. Vars, When God Spikes Your Drink: Guilty
Without Mens Rea, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 216 (2013) (disagreeing with
Michigan’s rejection of the diminished capacity doctrine, especially in light of
many states’ permitted intoxication defenses) (“Excluding mental health
evidence on intent, even prospectively, is indefensible. The new rule barring
such evidence did not really eliminate a ‘defense’—it effectively created a new
set of crimes for the mentally ill that do not require a finding of intent.”).
26 See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Rationality, Insanity, and the Insanity Defense:
Reflections on the Limits of Reason, 39 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 161, 168–69
20
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requisite intent—cannot respond to the State’s mens rea
case with evidence about these impairments. Instead, they
must wait until after conviction, when any mitigating
evidence of mental illness they can present has already lost
most of its weight. At this point, unfortunately, even the
best-case scenario of sentence reduction cannot make up for
the injustice of incurring a conviction based on the false
premise that a mentally ill defendant is “entirely sane.” 27
Therefore, this Note maintains that the legal fiction
of binary sanity promulgated by Ohio courts since Wilcox
creates a cognitive dissonance between one’s legal
culpability, as determined by a jury, and the debilitating
effects of mental illness in real life. It further argues that
although the public is aware of this cognitive dissonance, it
has chosen to pursue reforms that focus only on capital
defendants and fail to challenge the courts’ problematic
adherence to bright-line standards of sanity with respect to
noncapital defendants. This Note supports the passage of
S.B. 40, however, to the extent that it includes language
that could not only blur these lines (even if only for capital
defendants) but also present an opportunity for the courts
to reexamine Wilcox. Ultimately, this Note contends that
overturning Wilcox and opening the door to the doctrine of
diminished capacity are the most effective reforms to
protect both capital and noncapital mentally ill defendants;
it, furthermore, urges Ohio to adopt these reforms and give
these defendants the chance to introduce psychiatric
evidence short of insanity during the guilt phases of their
trials.
Part I will begin by orienting the reader to the
diminished capacity doctrine and associated terminology. It
will then establish the cause of the cognitive dissonance by
first, explaining the specific ways the Wilcox court blocked
this doctrine, and second, using death row inmate David
Sneed’s case to contrast the Wilcox reasoning with its realworld implications. Part II will delve further into the
measures taken by the United States and Ohio to address
this disconnect before examining the language of S.B. 40
(2014–2015) (“The existence of simple cognition—a thin version of
instrumental reality—should be an insufficient criterion, standing alone, for
finding sanity. Motivation, informed by human emotions, produces insane
conduct and insane crimes even when some modest form of cognition—the
ability to effectuate a simple syllogism, for example—is apparently
retained.”).
27 See Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 529-530.
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and analyzing its potential impact on criminal trials in
Ohio. Part III will then discuss the advantages and
limitations of this bill; explain how the bill could be
construed as a diminished capacity defense; and predict
that S.B. 40, if passed into law, would supersede Wilcox.
Finally, this Note will conclude with a return to Wilcox’s
story to show that Ohioans cannot truly resolve this
cognitive dissonance unless they allow mentally ill
defendants to assert the defenses of diminished capacity.
I.

CREATING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
A. A Definition of Diminished Capacity Defenses

Before grappling with the holding of Wilcox, it is
necessary to clarify the concepts of intent, culpability, and
diminished capacity, as applied in the context of criminal
proceedings and used in this Note. The U.S. Supreme Court
held in In re Winship that “the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.” 28 Therefore, to secure a
conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt all elements of a crime, including mens rea. 29
Because criminal intent is so subjective, courts have
generally allowed the State to prove its existence using
circumstantial evidence through an objective theory of
criminal liability, which presumes that all defendants are
sane and possess equal capacity to form intent. 30
Circumstantial evidence used to infer intent could include
the nature of the offense; the weapons used, if any; or even
the relationship between the victim and the defendant. 31
The doctrine of diminished capacity refers to the
mechanisms through which a defendant may introduce
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Id.; see also Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished
Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (1984) [hereinafter Morse,
Undiminished Confusion]. The only exception to this requirement occurs
when the crime is a “strict liability” crime, meaning the statute does not
include an element of intent.
30 Harlow M. Huckabee, Avoiding the Insanity Defense Straight Jacket: The
Mens Rea Route, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987); see also Clark v. Arizona, 548
U.S. 735, 766–67 (2006) (“This presumption [of sanity] dispenses with a
requirement on the government’s part to include as an element of every
criminal charge an allegation that the defendant had such a capacity.”).
31 J. Thomas Sullivan, The Culpability, or Mens Rea, “Defense” in Arkansas,
53 ARK. L. REV. 805, 810 (2000).
28
29
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psychiatric evidence short of insanity to reduce
culpability. 32 This Note will distinguish “legal culpability”
from “moral culpability.” “Legal culpability,” or criminal
culpability, will refer to the culpability a jury places on
defendants when convicting them of the charged crimes in
the guilt phase of a trial. A finding of legal culpability
means that the State has proved the intent element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt; however, because legal
culpability is assessed before the introduction of mitigating
psychiatric evidence, a jury may base its finding on the
potentially false assumption that the defendant is entirely
sane. In contrast, this Note will use “moral culpability” to
refer to the responsibility a judge or jury ascribes to a
defendant in the sentencing phase of a trial once they have
heard evidence of mental illness or impairment and are no
longer constrained by the legal fiction of binary sanity.
It is important to keep in mind that the assessment
of moral culpability might result in a sentence reduction 33
or exemption (such as in death penalty cases) 34, but it
cannot reach backwards to undermine the conviction of
guilt which opened the door to a particular sentencing
range in the first place. Where mitigation currently
remains limited to adjusting sentences according to moral
culpability, a defense of diminished capacity may reduce
either moral or legal culpability. Therefore, a diminished
capacity defense may cut against the law’s strict separation
of sanity from intent as well as blur the “bright lines”
surrounding the fiction of binary sanity.
The diminished capacity doctrine encompasses two
models or defenses: the partial responsibility variant and
the mens rea variant. 35 Partial responsibility is “a
The various concepts this doctrine encompasses can be confusing to track,
and scholars and courts have not helped by consistently using different
terms. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. Therefore, for the purposes
of this Note, “diminished capacity” or “diminished capacity defenses” will
refer to the doctrine as a whole rather than one of the doctrine’s specific
defenses.
33 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(C) (West 2018) (“The sentencing
court shall consider . . . relevant factors, as indicating that the offender’s
conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense . . . . (4)
There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender’s conduct, although
the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.”).
34 See, e.g., § 2929.04 (explaining the process by which juries may choose not
to sentence a capital defendant to death based on statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors).
35 Again, for clarity, this Note will echo Morse and use “partial responsibility”
or “the partial responsibility variant” to refer to the diminished capacity
32
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mitigation concept which has the effect of reducing the
degree of crime and, hence, reducing the punishment.” 36
Specifically, courts employing this defense allow juries to
treat a defendant’s mental abnormality as a formal
mitigating factor and reduce either the crime’s degree or
the punishment to be imposed based on the belief that the
defendant is less responsible than somebody without a
mental abnormality who violates the same statute. 37
Unlike the mens rea variant of diminished capacity, partial
responsibility does not require any causal connection
between a psychiatric disorder and a missing mens rea
element. 38 The existence of a mental illness or cognitive
disability alone is sufficient to reduce responsibility as an
affirmative defense. The partial responsibility defense is a
legal excuse, operating in the same way as the insanity
defense; however, where the insanity defense completely
excuses a defendant from responsibility, partial
responsibility does not. 39 Ohio’s S.B. 40 likely falls into the
category of introducing a partial responsibility excuse,
though some of its language also implicates the mens rea
model. 40
Contrary to partial responsibility, the mens rea
variant of diminished capacity is not an affirmative defense
but rather the equivalent to a plea of “not guilty” of the
crime charged. 41 It is a “failure of proof” defense 42 with
which the defendant is “straightforwardly denying the
affirmative defense premised on mental abnormality. Morse, Undiminished
Confusion, supra note 29, at 1. This Note will use “the mens rea variant” or
“the mens rea model” to refer to the diminished capacity “failure of proof”
defense which ties mental abnormality to missing intent to defeat the
prosecution’s prima facie case. For comparison’s sake, Arenella and others
sometimes use “diminished responsibility” or “the formal mitigation model” to
refer to partial responsibility. See Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity
and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed
Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 828–29 (1977). Morse notes that the mens
rea variant is often mischaracterized as “the defense of diminished capacity.”
Stephen J. Morse, Symposium, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 920 (2011) [hereinafter Morse, Mental
Disorder].
36 Huckabee, supra note 30, at 5–6.
37 See Arenella, supra note 35, at 829.
38 Gary O. Sommer, Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility:
Irreconcilable Doctrines Confused in State v. Wilcox, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1399,
1408–09 (1983).
39 Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35, at 925 (“Legal insanity is an
affirmative, complete defense to crime.”).
40 See discussion infra Parts II.B, III.B.
41 See Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 29, at 6.
42 Sommer, supra note 38, at 1403.
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prosecution’s . . . claim that a requisite mental element was
present at the time of the offense.” 43 Unlike partial
responsibility, the mens rea variant treats all defendants
alike but requires proof that “a sane defendant’s mental
abnormality at the time of the crime” prevented the
formation of the requisite intent. 44 Jurisdictions that allow
this model usually limit it to crimes of specific intent,
though it could apply to any crime requiring mens rea
proof. 45 A successful diminished capacity defense under the
mens rea model theoretically results in full acquittal,
though practically, it usually reduces the offense charged to
one that does not require proof of specific intent. 46 Scholars
have divided the mens rea model into two main forms:
“strict mens rea,” which allows psychiatric evidence to show
the defendant did not in fact possess the requisite mens rea
at the time of the crime, and “diminished mens rea,” which
allows the same evidence to prove the defendant lacks the
capacity to form the requisite mens rea and therefore did
not possess it at the time of the crime. 47
Professor Peter Arenella explains that the strict
mens rea approach is unlikely to serve a purpose outside
the context of insanity because of how difficult it is to
negate intent. 48 Even when a defendant is found to be
legally insane, the state can almost always still prove
intent. 49 Therefore, very little evidence would be relevant to
come in under this approach. The diminished mens rea
approach, however, can sometimes look like partial
responsibility because it allows “all evidence tending to
show that the defendant was less capable than an ordinary
defendant of entertaining the requisite intent.” 50 Arenella
argues that this approach allows the admission of almost
Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 29, at 6.
Arenella, supra note 35, at 828.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 829.
47 See Sommer, supra note 38, at 1404–06. Some scholars refer to these forms
as the “strict” approach and the “diminished capacity” approach which could
obviously be confused for the overall doctrine of diminished capacity.
Therefore, this Note adopts Sommer’s simple classification to make it clear
that “strict mens rea” and “diminished mens rea” are both subsets of the mens
rea model of diminished capacity.
48 See Arenella, supra note 35, at 834.
49 See Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35, at 906 n. 69; see also, e.g., Clark
v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 745, 756 (2006) (finding intent despite the fact the
defendant’s schizophrenia caused him to believe that he was killing aliens,
not police officers).
50 Arenella, supra note 35, at 835.
43
44
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unlimited psychiatric evidence as long as expert witnesses
can claim a defendant’s mental abnormality impairs
cognition or conduct. 51 In the 1960s, California shifted its
strict mens rea approach to a diminished one, and the
result was that expert testimony also shifted from using
psychiatric evidence to prove the absence of requisite intent
to using it to explain why defendants possessed the
requisite intent. 52
Distinguishing the defenses of diminished capacity is
essential to understanding how the passage of S.B. 40
would undermine the ruling in Wilcox. 53 Unfortunately, the
Wilcox court bundled the concepts of partial responsibility
and both parts of the mens rea model, naming only “the
diminished capacity defense” throughout its opinion. 54
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify which defenses Wilcox
specifically barred, as well as to demonstrate some
shortcomings in the court’s reasoning, before examining the
language in S.B. 40.
B. The Ohio Supreme Court’s Rejection of
Diminished Capacity Defenses
The Ohio Supreme Court’s main reason for reversing
the appellate court was that by relying on State v. Nichols 55
to claim that Ohio recognized a diminished capacity
defense, the lower court had ignored a more recent case 56 in
which the state supreme court formally considered and
rejected the defense. 57 Because Wilcox had attempted a
diminished mens rea defense (arguing he lacked the
capacity to form the requisite intent due to his mental
illnesses), the court’s holding—barring a defendant’s ability
to “offer expert psychiatric testimony, unrelated to the
insanity defense, to show that the defendant lacked the
mental capacity to form the specific mental state required
See id.
Id. at 831 (“Because these psychiatric explanations of the defendant’s
actions invite the jury to treat the accused’s mental disability as a formal
mitigating factor, the result was the creation of a partial defense
indistinguishable from the diminished responsibility model.”).
53 See discussion infra Section III.B.
54 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 525.
55 209 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
56 See Ohio v. Jackson, 291 N.E.2d 432, 433 (Ohio 1972), superseded by
statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (West 2018), as recognized in Ohio v.
Humphries, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio 1977).
57See Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 524.
51
52
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for a particular crime or degree of crime” 58—explicitly
rejected only the mens rea variant of diminished capacity. A
closer look at the principles guiding the court’s decision,
however, reveals an implicit rejection of the partial
responsibility variant as well. 59
After initially summarizing the doctrine’s legal
evolution, the Wilcox court listed the following justifications
for “the diminished capacity defense”: (1) it helps make up
for the limitations of a flawed insanity test; (2) it allows a
jury to avoid sentencing to death convicted murderers who
are mentally disabled; (3) it allows for more accurate and
individualized assessments of culpability; and (4) it is
congruent with some jurisdictions’ acceptance of evidence of
intoxication to negate specific intent. 60 The court then
proceeded to refute each of these justifications in turn
before ending with a final pronouncement against
diminished capacity based on California’s failed attempts to
implement a sustainable diminished capacity doctrine. 61
Addressing the first justification, the court reasoned
that while diminished capacity might ameliorate the
M’Naghten version of the insanity test, 62 Ohio actually used
a more liberal test, and this fact precluded the need for a
partial responsibility option. 63 Additionally, the court
worried that defendants would opt for using a diminished
capacity defense over insanity in order to avoid indefinite
Id. at 533.
See Sommer, supra note 38, at 1400.
60 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 525–26 (paraphrasing Arenella, supra note 35 at
853).
61 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at
530–531 (“The California courts struggled to evolve a coherent diminished
capacity framework but the difficulties inherent in the doctrine, e.g., its
subjectivity, its non-uniform and exotic terminology, its open-endedness, and
its quixotic results in particular cases, were not overcome . . . .”). For the sake
of concision, this Note will focus only on the Ohio Supreme Court’s first four
reasons for rejecting the defenses of diminished capacity, as the court’s
discussion of California’s experience serves merely as an illustration of the
Wilcox court’s reasoning. Furthermore, this example of California in the
1960’s is less relevant to a discussion of Ohio policy in 2019.
62 See discussion supra note 2 (explaining the various insanity tests that have
been used, particularly in Ohio).
63 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 526–27 (“The ameliorative argument loses much of
its force, however, in jurisdictions that have abandoned or expanded upon the
narrow M’Naghten standard . . . . Thus we see no reason to fashion a halfway
measure, e.g., diminished capacity, when an accused may present a
meaningful insanity defense in a proper case.”); see also discussion supra note
2 (explaining that during Wilcox’s trial, Ohio had an insanity test in place
that was more flexible than the M’Naughten rule yet not as broad as the
Model Penal Code’s test).
58
59

2019]

Rebutting Binary Sanity

355

commitment and get reduced prison time. 64 It is unclear
why the court assumed that the same defendants would
qualify for both insanity and all forms of diminished
capacity, but this argument fits in with the court’s
overarching desire to keep the insanity determination an
“all-or-nothing” concept. 65
The court quickly dismissed the death penalty
justification by first, noting that recent legislation had
created a smaller group of capital crimes, and second,
mentioning that evidence of mental illness could now come
in as a formal mitigation factor in the newly bifurcated
proceedings. 66 It is worth noting that even as the court
maintained no other mitigation outside the insanity
defense was needed, it admitted the need to bring in
evidence of mental capacity at some point in a capital
trial. 67
The court wove its final two points together to
address the feasibility of using diminished capacity for
“more accurate, individualized culpability judgments.” 68
While the court responded specifically to the analogies
drawn between diminished capacity and, in turn, the
insanity defense and intoxication excuse, it is difficult to
separate its rationale here from its language throughout
the entire decision. 69 Namely, this section—heavily
comprised of language from other courts and experts—most
clearly elaborates the two premises undergirding Wilcox:
(1) an inherent distrust of psychological or psychiatric
evidence, 70 and (2) a strong desire to maintain the “bright-

Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 527.
Id. at 529 (“Theoretically the insanity concept operates as a bright line test
separating the criminally responsible from the criminally irresponsible. The
diminished capacity concept on the other hand posits a series of rather blurry
lines representing gradations of culpability.”) (citation omitted).
66 Id. at 527–28.
67 Id. at 528 (“Mental capacity is a formal mitigating factor in capital cases
under current Ohio law at the punishment stage of the now bifurcated
proceedings. Thus the ameliorative purpose served by the diminished
capacity defense in capital cases has largely been accomplished by other
means.”).
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also infra notes 141 and 142.
70 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 529 (“While some courts may have blind faith in all
phases of psychiatry, this court does not. There is substantial doubt whether
evidence such as was sought to be introduced here is scientifically sound, and
there is substantial legal doubt that it is probative on the point for which it
was asserted in this case.”) (quoting Steele v. State, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13 (Wis.
1980)).
64
65
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line” dichotomy between sanity and insanity. 71 According to
the court, it is too difficult for juries to separate the
“reasonable” or “responsible” legally sane defendants from
the “unreasonable” or “less responsible” ones, which is why
the law created the fiction of binary sanity in the first
place. 72 The court wrote:
In light of the linedrawing difficulties courts
and juries face when assessing expert evidence
to
make
the
‘bright
line’
insanity
determination, we are not at all confident that
similar evidence will enable juries, or the
judges who must instruct them, to bring the
blurred lines of diminished capacity into proper
focus so as to facilitate principled and
consistent decision-making in criminal cases. 73
The language echoes the court’s first point regarding the
sufficiency of the insanity defense, and the court reiterated
these points when turning to how diminished capacity was
implemented in California. 74
In short, the main obstacle for criminal defendants
with mental illnesses that do not amount to legal insanity
is not the court’s denial that diminished capacity exists, but
rather the court’s aversion to trusting psychologists with
their juries, or perhaps, juries with psychologists. Yet while
the court emphasized the risk of the legally insane “taking
advantage” 75 of the diminished capacity defense, it failed to
consider legally sane defendants who, nonetheless, suffer
cognitive or volitional impairments due to mental illness. It
71 Id. at 528 (“‘The essence of the diminished capacity concept . . . is that the
circumstance of mental deficiency should not be confined to use as an all-ornothing defense. It is true, of course, that the existence of the required state
of mind is to be determined subjectively . . . according to the particular
circumstances of a given case. However, this fact may not be allowed to
obscure the critical difference between the legal concepts of mens rea and
insanity.’”) (quoting Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 86–88 (D.C. 1976)).
72 Id. at 529 (“‘The line between the sane and the insane for purposes of
criminal adjudication is not drawn because for one group the actual existence
of the necessary mental state (or lack thereof) can be determined with any
greater certainty, but rather because those whom the law declares insane are
demonstrably so aberrational in their psychiatric characteristics that we
choose to make the assumption that they are incapable of possessing the
specified state of mind.’”) (quoting Bethea, 365 A.2d, at 87).
73 Id. at 530.
74 See supra note 61 (quoting the court’s language about California).
75 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 527 (“[T]he principal practical effect of the
diminished capacity defense is to enable mentally ill offenders to receive
shorter and more certain sentences than they would receive if they were
adjudged insane.”).
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is understandable that psychiatric evidence would be
difficult to fit inside this court’s bright lines, but the
question remains, why should these fictional lines take
priority over the real experiences of people whose mental
illnesses fall along a spectrum?
Nonetheless, Wilcox remains authoritative in barring
legally sane Ohio defendants from introducing evidence of
mental illness to negate intent, and the court’s tendency to
disbelieve psychiatric evidence along with its resolve to
make the insanity determination an either/or decision stays
influential. It is on this expansive platform, rather than its
narrow holding, that Wilcox seems to bar all defenses of
diminished capacity. However, as Sommer and Morse point
out, the court weakened its own holding against the mens
rea variants of diminished capacity by supporting it with
reasons pertaining almost exclusively to the partial
responsibility variant (namely, its refusal to entertain any
defense besides insanity arguing non-responsibility based
on mental abnormality). 76 While the next section
demonstrates how these reasons failed even then to protect
the rights of mentally ill criminal defendants, it is
ultimately a proposal like S.B. 40—which introduces a
death sentence exemption for legally sane capital
defendants with serious mental illness—that could wipe
Wilcox reasoning from relevance because it not only trusts
psychologists as expert witnesses but also dims the line
between the sane and insane. 77
C. The Real-World Implications of Wilcox Logic
In most American jurisdictions, defendants do not
have the option to present a diminished capacity defense, so
they must rely on either the insanity defense or sentence
mitigation to give them the opportunity to introduce
psychiatric evidence showing reduced culpability. But
despite the Wilcox court’s contention, neither option
provides significant protection. Contrary to public
perception, the insanity defense is rarely raised, is raised in
just one percent of felony cases, is used nearly twice as
often in nonhomicide cases than in homicide cases, and
Sommer, supra note 38, at 1400; Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra
note 29, at 7–8, n.19.
77 See infra note 129 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part
III.C.
76
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when raised, is successful only one quarter of the time. 78 A
defendant claiming insanity does so as an affirmative
defense—even when successful, it does not negate the
prosecution’s ability to prove the elements of a crime, as the
mens rea model of diminished capacity could do. Instead, a
successful insanity defense results in the defendant’s
exemption from criminal responsibility. 79 The insanity
defense is one of the few recognized excuses for criminal
culpability. 80 As Morse notes, however, “[e]xcuse is
warranted only in those cases in which the impairment is
sufficient, which is a moral and legal question,” and not a
question of medicine or psychology. 81
Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Gregg v. Georgia, 82 states like Ohio do allow psychiatric
evidence to come in at the sentencing phase of capital trials
as mitigating factors, but juries have full discretion over
the amount of weight to place on such evidence, 83 and
sometimes this evidence can be a double-edged sword
actually increasing a jury’s likelihood to impose the death
sentence. 84 Moreover, there is no separate sentencing phase
in noncapital cases—a judge has full discretion over how
78 Tyler Ellis, Comment, Mental Illness, Legal Culpability, & Due Process:
Why the Fourteenth Amendment Allows States to Choose a Mens Rea Insanity
Defense Over a M’Naghten Approach, 84 MISS. L.J. 215, 238, nn.141–42
(2014).
79 State v. Curry, 543 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Ohio 1989) (“Conversely, where the
state has proved every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
including the mental element, the accused may present evidence that he was
insane at the time of the offense and thus should not be held criminally
responsible.”); see also Sommer, supra note 38, at 1402.
80 Other legal excuses include self-defense or “accidental killing” for homicide
and duress or coercion in nonhomicide cases. Ronald A. Case, Annotation,
Homicide: Burden of Proof on Defense that Killing was Accidental, 63
A.L.R.3d 936 (1975); L.I. Reiser, Annotation, Coercion, Compulsion, or Duress
as Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 40 A.L.R.2d 908 (1955).
81 Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35 at 926.
82 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding constitutional the bifurcated nature of capital
trials which separates the guilt phase from the sentencing phase so long as
the sentencing authority had sufficient information and guidance so as not to
result in the “arbitrary and capricious” imposition of the death penalty).
83 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (West 2018).
84 Richard J. Bonnie, Mental Illness, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Death Penalty: A New Frontier, 42 HUM. RIGHTS MAG., Mar. 2017, at 21, 21
(“Some attorneys will choose not to present highly relevant evidence of
mental illness because of fear that jurors will not consider it, or will view it as
evidence of future dangerousness rather than diminished moral culpability. .
. . Indeed, the Court [in Atkins v. Virginia] worried that because of this
‘double-edged sword’ phenomenon, which applies equally to those with
intellectual disabilities, those who had the lowest moral culpability and were
the least deserving of execution were actually more likely to be sentenced to
death.”).
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much weight to afford mitigating evidence such as mental
health. As explained in the Introduction, by the time that
psychiatric evidence comes out to mitigate a sentence in
either a capital or noncapital trial, it has already lost the
weight that it could have had in trial because now it must
go up against a conviction.
David Sneed’s story demonstrates the shortcomings
in the Wilcox court’s reasoning that Ohio sufficiently
protects mentally ill defendants. While Wilcox himself was
not actually facing the death penalty, the uncanny
similarities between his case and Sneed’s demonstrate that
the court was considering a defendant like Sneed when it
assessed that there were enough protections in capital
cases to not need a diminished capacity defense. 85 While
Sneed’s case alone is not sufficient to overturn the
reasoning in the court’s two premises, 86 it does start to
unravel the court’s logic as it shows how misguided the
court was in assuming that the insanity defense 87 and
mitigation phase were enough to provide mentally ill
capital defendants with a fair trial.
David Sneed is on Ohio’s death row for aggravated
murder and aggravated robbery. 88 On November 19, 1984,
Sneed and a companion hitched a ride from a twenty-sixyear-old man and then demanded money from him at
gunpoint. 89 When the driver refused, Sneed and his
companion each shot the driver in the head, resulting in his
death. 90 Sneed’s accomplice eventually confessed and
85 As the following paragraphs will relate, both Wilcox and Sneed were
convicted of aggravated murder, though Sneed was also convicted of
aggravated robbery where Wilcox’s second conviction was aggravated
burglary. Both defendants were initially determined to be incompetent to
stand trial, but were later found to be competent. Moreover, both defendants
suffered from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and other issues related to
organic brain damage. Though Sneed was a principal offender and faced the
death penalty where Wilcox was and did not, neither defendant was able to
use the insanity defense in the manner the Wilcox court intended when it
stated, “[W]e see no reason to fashion a halfway measure, e.g., diminished
capacity, when an accused may present a meaningful insanity defense in a
proper case.” Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 527. Therefore, both defendants’ only
remaining options were to introduce psychiatric evidence to either reduce
responsibility or prove missing criminal intent. And both defendants were
barred from doing so.
86 See supra notes 70 and 71 and accompanying text.
87 In 1986, Ohio was still using the more liberal insanity test that was used
during Wilcox’s trial. See discussion supra note 2.
88 State v. Sneed, 584 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (Ohio 1992).
89 Sneed v. Johnson, No. 1:04CV588, 2007 WL 709778, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar.
2, 2007).
90 Id.
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avoided the death penalty by signing a plea deal, 91 but the
jury found Sneed guilty of all charges and recommended
the death penalty, which the trial court adopted and
imposed. 92
Drawing on facts recorded by the state and federal
courts in their decisions denying Sneed’s appeals,
Harvard’s Fair Punishment Project describes Sneed as
suffering from severe mental illnesses, “significantly belowaverage” intellectual abilities, and psychological damage
from repeated physical and sexual abuse and neglect in his
childhood. 93 The jury heard much of this evidence in this
mitigation phase, including testimony that his father was
an alcoholic; that his mother was imprisoned for child
endangerment, resulting in Sneed’s placement in foster
care; that he had to relocate homes frequently; and that his
school attendance and test scores were poor. 94
The jury also heard from friends, family, and
examining psychologists that Sneed suffered from bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia, and other personality disorders,
and that he had gone off his medication and begun
displaying increasingly erratic behavior before he
committed the crime. 95 When asked about how Sneed’s
mental illness may have contributed to his crime, both Dr.
Edward Dutton and Dr. Mijo Zakman pointed to his bipolar
disorder and borderline intellectual functioning as having
substantially decreased Sneed’s capacity to recognize the
criminality of his actions. 96 Despite these mitigating
factors, the jury found that the aggravating circumstances
tipped the scales in favor of the death sentence. For the
purposes of developing an accurate portrayal of Sneed’s
mental health, it is worth noting that the jury did not hear
any evidence of sexual abuse or possible brain damage
because these were not discovered until Dr. Jeffrey L.
Smalldon examined Sneed before he filed his petition for
post-conviction relief in 1993. 97
In this post-conviction report, Dr. Smalldon
presented testimony from Sneed’s sister that his foster
family had sexually abused him when he was a toddler and
Sneed v. Johnson, 600 F.3d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 2010).
Sneed, 584 N.E.2d at 1164.
93 The Fair Punishment Project, supra note 12.
94 Johnson, 2007 WL 709778, at *57–59.
95 Id. at *48, 57–59.
96 Sneed, 584 N.E.2d at 1174.
97 Johnson, 2007 WL 709778, at *49.
91
92
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speculated that he may have been sexually abused by other
adults as well. 98 Moreover, Sneed disclosed abuse from at
least two such adults, reporting years of repeated rapes and
psychological torture inflicted by an “extremely big” male
neighbor, as well as encounters with a friend of his
mother’s, who would take Sneed into an abandoned home
and pay him money to perform oral sex. 99 Dr. Smalldon also
noted that Sneed admitted that he had never told anyone
about this abuse because he “always felt ‘too embarrassed
and too scared.’” 100 In addition to the egregious sexual
abuse, Dr. Smalldon documented evidence of brain
impairment; specifically, abnormal brain functioning
contributing to Sneed’s maladaptive behavior. 101 While Dr.
Smalldon admitted in his report that he could not conclude
with certainty how much these factors influenced Sneed at
the time of his crime, he did state, “it is clear that he was
decompensating.” 102
Indeed, both the evidence presented at mitigation
and the fact that Sneed was initially declared incompetent
for trial support Dr. Smalldon’s contention. According to
the record, the court found Sneed incompetent to stand trial
on April 12, 1985, after hearing that “Sneed had been
treated for mental problems on three prior occasions and
that personnel at the Stark County Sheriff’s Department
had taken Sneed to the Massillon State Hospital since his
arrest because he was behaving irrationally.” 103 Sneed was
also diagnosed with “severe manic bipolar disorder and a
schizo-affective disorder involving hallucinations and
delusions.” 104 The court declared him competent to stand
trial on February 10, 1986, based on the fact Sneed’s
condition drastically improved with the regular use of
psychotropic medication. 105
Given the clear unraveling of Sneed’s mental
capacity, one might wonder why his lawyers did not pursue
the insanity defense. However, in its denial of Sneed’s
habeas petition, the Sixth Circuit held that Sneed’s counsel
was objectively reasonable in deciding against this defense
Id. at *60.
Id. at *59–60.
100 Id. at *60.
101 Id. at *61.
102 Id. at *49 n.35.
103 Id. at *34.
104 Id.
105 Id.
98
99
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due to the following four obstacles: (1) conflicting
psychiatric testimony over whether Sneed knew the
wrongfulness of his actions; 106 (2) prosecutorial evidence
that Sneed might be faking his insanity; (3) Sneed’s actions
directly before and after the crime making him seem
calculated; and (4) public skepticism of the insanity defense
due to the recent unpopular trial outcome of John Hinckley,
Jr. 107 Thus, as the federal district court stated, “while an
insanity defense was clearly available to counsel based on
Sneed’s diagnosis of significant mental illness, it was by no
means a perfect defense.” 108 With an unlikely chance of
success pleading insanity and no other recognized defense
based on mental illness, Sneed had no choice but to reserve
this evidence for the mitigation phase, where the jury had
no obligation to afford it any great weight.
Heinous though Sneed’s crime may be, the
overwhelming amount of psychiatric evidence puts Sneed’s
sanity and overall culpability in question, making him a
likely candidate for exclusion from the death penalty should
Ohio’s pending legislation pass. Both the wrongfulness of
Sneed’s presence on death row and the continuing existence
of the same procedural shortcomings that put him there in
1986 make this case tragic.
II.

ADDRESSING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
A. Death Penalty Exemptions

Even if the average person might not read Wilcox or
point specifically to the “legal fiction of binary sanity” as
the source for the cognitive dissonance they feel, the
milestone cases and proposed initiatives in the world of
death penalty jurisprudence demonstrate that most people
feel the friction between legal culpability and moral
culpability. The problem for many defendants with mental
Ohio’s standard for insanity at the time of this case included both the
cognition and volition prongs, see discussion supra note 2, meaning that
Sneed’s lawyers could have also proved insanity by showing Sneed’s inability
to conform his conduct to legal requirements even if he knew right from
wrong. However, the Sixth Circuit noted that even though the district court
used the wrong insanity-defense standard, the other three obstacles provided
a great enough challenge to Sneed’s burden of proving insanity that his
lawyers were still reasonable to pursue a different defense strategy. Sneed v.
Johnson, 600 F.3d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 2010).
107 Id.
108 Johnson, 2007 WL 709778, at *49.
106
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illness is that society has attempted to ease this friction by
focusing on reducing the consequences of convictions for
those it deems less morally culpable, rather than seeking to
challenge the convictions themselves.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of
culpability for the death penalty in a handful of landmark
cases, particularly holding unconstitutional the executions
of the legally insane, 109 the intellectually disabled, 110 and
juveniles. 111 When the Court exempted the intellectually
disabled from the death penalty, it reasoned that “[t]heir
deficiencies . . . diminish their personal culpability” and
that executing them serves none of the recognized
justifications for the death penalty. 112 The exemption was
necessary, according to the Court, because although these
individuals often know right from wrong and are therefore
unlikely to succeed with an insanity defense, “they have
diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes
and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning,
to control impulses, and to understand others’ reactions.” 113
Moreover, the Court stated that these deficiencies posed
risks during the mitigation phase of both the defendant’s
inability to properly assist counsel and the jury’s increased
likelihood to find future dangerousness. 114 When the Court
exempted juveniles from the death penalty in Roper v.
Simmons, 115 it considered characteristics such as
impulsivity, ill-considered action, and susceptibility to peer
pressure to be reasons for reduced culpability. 116
However, despite the fact that mentally ill
defendants who are not legally insane present the same
culpability concerns addressed in the cases above, there has
not yet been any such death penalty exemption for “serious
mental illness.” 117 In 2006, the American Bar Association
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
111 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
112 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. The Court went on to explain the executions
would be “purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering” (quoting
Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S., 782, 798 (1982)) because the offenders’
diminished culpability undermined any retributive purpose of punishment,
and their cognitive and behavioral impairments made a deterrence purpose
equally useless. Id. at 318–20.
113 Id. at 306.
114 Id. at 320–21.
115 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
116 Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35, at 937 n.177.
117 Bonnie, supra note 84.
109
110
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(ABA), American Psychiatric Association, American
Psychological Association, and National Alliance on Mental
Illness endorsed an exemption based on diminished
responsibility for defendants with serious mental illness,
and Mental Health America joined in 2011. 118 Additionally,
several states, in addition to Ohio, are currently
considering legislation to adopt variations of this principle,
which states:
Defendants should not be executed or
sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense,
they had a severe mental disorder or disability
that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to
appreciate the nature, consequences or
wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise
rational judgment in relation to conduct, or (c)
to conform their conduct to requirements of the
law. 119
Because substantial mental illnesses, like
intellectual disabilities, put legal culpability into question,
it is worth asking whether the continued adherence to
Wilcox has cost Ohio its ability to “ensure that only the
most deserving of execution are put to death.” 120
Furthermore, even though the death penalty
exemptions that have been made are necessary and right,
they still uphold the legal fiction of binary sanity that is so
damaging to defendants with mental illnesses who won’t
see a sentence reduction or exemption. In basing these
exemptions on diminished moral culpability alone, the
Court supported the idea that somebody whose culpability
renders them ineligible for the death penalty can still be
convicted at trial and found to have possessed the requisite
criminal intent for the crime. Conversely, reforms that
challenge the assertion that a legally insane person can
possess the requisite intent will subsequently make intent
harder to prove against mentally ill defendants and will
necessarily also lead to fairer sentences. A defendant who
successfully raises reasonable doubt about their ability to
form the crime’s required intent does not get convicted or
sentenced; even a defendant who can present such evidence
Id.
Id.
120 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (holding that executions of
intellectually disabled criminals, whom the Court refers to as “mentally
retarded” criminals, are unconstitutional).
118
119
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to lower the charges ends up with a lesser sentence by
default.
U.S. law already provides precedent for such reforms
to take place. Many jurisdictions recognize doctrines such
as provocation or extreme mental or emotional disturbance
that can reduce homicide charges on the premise that
defendants who successfully raise this defense were less
culpable at the time of their crime. 121 Additionally, though
it applies only to non-violent offenders, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines allow for sentence reduction in cases
where a “significantly reduced mental capacity”
substantially contributed to a crime’s commission. 122 Morse
classifies these efforts as “recogniz[ing] the moral
importance of ‘partial responsibility’ for determining just
punishment,” 123 despite the fact that American
jurisprudence has not yet followed some European nations
in adopting this doctrine. 124
The Wilcox court was skeptical and believed that
every defendant would take advantage of the opportunity to
claim a defense of diminished capacity, but already,
proposed legislation like S.B. 40 is demonstrating how legal
culpability can be challenged on the basis of mental
impairment without opening the door to everyone. It is too
early to determine how the language of state initiatives like
S.B. 40 would operate if passed into law, but by requiring
courts to examine a defendant’s mental capacity at the
commission of the crime, these bills open the door to
question legal culpability while still providing an exemption
for diminished moral culpability. This aspect could set them
apart from prior death penalty exemptions.
B. Proposed Legislation
The Fair Punishment Project that published the
report on Ohio’s death row 125 is not alone in its concerns
about Ohio. In 2003, the ABA’s Death Penalty Review
Project assessed a number of states’ capital punishment

Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35, at 935–36.
Id. at 936.
123 Id.
124 Arenella, supra note 35, at 829–30.
125 The Fair Punishment Project, supra note 12.
121
122
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systems to determine their fairness. 126 When the ABA’s
Project released its report in 2007, it “noted that Ohio has a
significant number of people with severe mental disabilities
on death row, some of whom were disabled at the time of
the offense,” and recommended that the state adopt a law
prohibiting such individuals from receiving the death
penalty. 127 In 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court and Ohio
State Bar Association Joint Task Force to Review the
Administration of Ohio’s Death Penalty (appointed in 2011
to review the ABA’s report) agreed and submitted this
recommendation, among over fifty others, to Chief Justice
O’Connor and State Bar Association President Marx. 128 As
a result, Ohio Senate Bill 40 was introduced to prohibit
defendants found to have a “serious mental illness” from
receiving the death sentence.
As currently drafted, the bill defines “serious mental
illness” (SMI) as a diagnosis of schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive
disorder, or delusional disorder where the condition existed
at the time of the crime and significantly impaired the
defendant’s capacity to exercise rational judgment about
conduct, conform conduct to requirements of the law, or
appreciate the “nature, consequences, or wrongfulness” of
conduct. 129 A person charged with aggravated murder may
tell the court before trial that they have an SMI, and the
court will then require an evaluation of the defendant and
conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether the
condition exists. 130 If the defendant submits prima facie
evidence of the condition, the court will presume the
condition significantly impaired defendant’s capacity at the
time of the crime, and the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
contest the diagnosis, rebut the presumption of significant
impairment, or both. 131 If the prosecutor cannot show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person does not
have an SMI, then the defendant becomes ineligible for the
death penalty. 132
JOINT TASK FORCE TO REVIEW THE ADMINISTRATION OF OHIO’S DEATH
PENALTY, FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (April 2014), https://www.
supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/deathPenalty/resources/finalReport.pdf.
127 Id. at 6.
128 Id.
129 S.B. 40, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at 8–9 (Ohio 2017), https://www.
legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132-SB-40.
130 Id. at 10.
131 Id. at 11.
132 Id.
126
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One nuance in this proposed legislation is that if the
court does not find the defendant to have an SMI in the
pretrial hearing, the defendant may still opt to present the
matter to the jury. 133 The current language specifically
states that if a defendant chooses to put this matter before
a jury, any evidence from the pretrial hearing may be
introduced as well as any other relevant evidence to make
the case that the condition existed at the time of the crime
and significantly impaired the person’s conduct. 134 The bill
states simply that this evidence may be introduced at
“trial,” so it is unclear whether that means the guilt phase
or the mitigation phase. However, the Legislative Service
Commission’s bill analysis uses “trial” and “sentencing
hearing” to refer to the two parts of a capital trial, so one
can presume the proposed legislation would allow the jury
to hear this psychiatric evidence and decide the matter of
SMI during the guilt phase of the trial. 135
The Legislative Service Commission also explains
that when the court orders an examiner to evaluate the
defendant, “no statement that a person makes in an
evaluation ordered . . . relating to the person’s serious
mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the
aggravated murder may be used against the person on the
issue of guilt in any criminal action or proceeding.” 136
However, either side may call the examiner as a witness,
and the court-ordered evaluation does not preclude either
side from calling other witnesses to testify on the matter of
the defendant’s SMI. 137 It is unclear how the court will
separate this evidence from evidence on the matter of guilt,
or if the defendant will actually be allowed to use this
evidence to challenge the matter of guilt. The bill states
only that existence of mental illness may not be used
against the defendant to prove guilt.
In summary, S.B. 40 is novel not only for
establishing a new death penalty categorical exemption for
defendants with specific mental illnesses but also for
crafting a procedure that could bring psychiatric evidence
short of insanity to the jury during the trial for the first
Id. at 12.
Id.
135 DENNIS M. PAPP, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION BILL ANALYSIS OF
S.B. 40, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Ohio 2017),
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=6453&format=pdf.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 5–6.
133
134
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time since Wilcox. Because this bill allows mental
abnormality short of insanity to prove reduced culpability
(whether legal, moral, or both), it incorporates at least one
defense of diminished capacity by definition, overriding
Wilcox and unlocking the door of diminished capacity to
mentally ill noncapital defendants as well.
III.

RESOLVING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
A. Advantages of S.B. 40

Even without impacting Wilcox, the advantages of
this proposal for mentally ill capital defendants are
numerous. The most significant aid is that it lowers the
burden of proof for defendants with the diagnoses listed—
instead of making defendants prove their mental illness by
a preponderance of the evidence, the same burden would be
on the state to disprove it. And instead of forcing
defendants to show how their mental illness impaired their
capacity, the court would presume this occurrence. Had this
law existed for David Sneed, he would have been allowed to
introduce evidence of his mental illnesses even though he
did not plead insanity. At the pretrial hearing, he likely
would have successfully presented a prima facie case of
serious mental illness due to his bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia. The State then could have attempted to
rebut the presumption that it significantly impaired Sneed
at the commission of his crime. Future caselaw will have to
determine what factors would help the State win that
argument; regardless, the fact remains this law would have
given Sneed more defense options and could have saved
him from receiving the death penalty.
Furthermore, as mentioned in Part II, it is unclear
whether S.B. 40 strictly provides death penalty exemptions
to defendants convicted of aggravated murder found to have
an SMI, or whether the evidence of an SMI could also
undermine legal culpability in the trial if the defendant
chooses to put the preliminary question of the mental
illness to the jury. Either way, this bill embodies the
rationale behind the diminished capacity doctrine, meaning
that its passage could at once neutralize Wilcox and
reintroduce Ohio to the diminished capacity defenses.
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B. Limitations of S.B. 40
The bill does have some limitations, including the
fact that without supplanting Wilcox, it does nothing for
mentally ill noncapital defendants. First, the limitation to
the five diagnoses at the beginning automatically means
that anybody with mental disorders that also impair
capacity but did not make this list are still forced to choose
between the insanity defense or mitigation. Furthermore, it
is unclear what evidence—if any—the jury would be
allowed to hear on the defendant’s mental illness if the
court deems the defendant ineligible for the death sentence
in the pretrial hearing. Evidence of mental illness could
still act as the aforementioned “double-edged sword” the
Atkins Court was concerned about and so could still affect
sentencing even short of the death penalty. And, obviously,
if this evidence is not allowed to come into the guilt phase
of the trial at all, this bill does not change anything where
legal culpability is concerned.
Finally, in the event that the bill supersedes Wilcox
but courts are slow to adapt, the manner in which the
prosecution would be permitted at the pretrial hearing to
rebut the presumption that the mental illness impaired
capacity could be problematic. Namely, allowing the State
to use evidence of intent to rebut this presumption would be
unfair if the State has not yet proven intent at trial. This
disparity would be even worse if the State were able to use
this hearing as an additional opportunity to discount
psychiatric evidence by pointing to intent while defendants
remain unable to use psychiatric evidence to negate intent
during the trial. This inequality would resemble the
arguably unfair way that capital trial juries in the
mitigation phase can consider the existence of aggravating
factors to discount any mitigating mental health evidence,
even if those aggravating factors (or the crime itself) would
not have existed but for the defendant’s mental health
issues.
Given the radical change S.B. 40 would make to
existing law, however, it is unlikely that courts
implementing these new capital trial procedures would not
be apprised of Wilcox’s probable overturn and adjust
accordingly. To the extent that S.B. 40 would create a new
diminished capacity defense based on partial responsibility,
its passage would necessarily replace the Wilcox decision,
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which implicitly rejected partial responsibility due to its
“blurring” the bright line between the sane and the insane.
And though the court’s holding explicitly rejected only the
mens rea model due to its distrust of psychology, S.B. 40
leaves room for a diminished mens rea defense by allowing
defendants to present psychiatric evidence to the jury
during trial. Fortunately, the Wilcox opinion ended by
echoing Bethea, stating, “If such principles are to be
incorporated into our law of criminal responsibility, the
change should lie within the province of the legislature.” 138
C. Wilcox Revisited
By now, it is clear that S.B. 40 would legally
supersede Wilcox because it would permit and potentially
establish the diminished capacity defenses the Ohio
Supreme Court formerly banned. And while this result
might be unintended, it should actually motivate Ohio
legislators to pass S.B. 40 because the very need for this bill
undermines Wilcox reasoning in the first place. There is no
question here of preferred policy—the proposed legislation
instead has proven Wilcox wrong so that to vote this bill
into law is to already reject the two premises comprising
Wilcox.
Where the Wilcox court rejected the mens rea
variants of diminished capacity, seeking to keep psychiatric
evidence from proving purposes unrelated to the insanity
defense, 139 the proposed legislation answers instead with a
solution based on partial responsibility. And where the
Wilcox court rejected partial responsibility, insisting on allor-nothing sanity tests because it distrusted psychological
evidence and feared that juries could never ascertain the
mental capabilities of the legally sane, 140 the proposed
legislation responds with a reliable method by which the
court and jury can easily separate legally sane defendants
with reduced capacity from those without. Furthermore,
the legislation would operate in a world entirely different
from 1982—Ohio now uses the strictest form of the

State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523, 533 (quoting Bethea v. United States, 365
A.2d 64, 92 (D.C. 1976)).
139 Id. at 530 (“In short, the fact that psychiatric evidence is admissible to
prove or disprove insanity does not necessarily dictate the conclusion that it
is admissible for purposes unrelated to the insanity defense.”).
140 See id. at 528–29.
138
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M’Naghten test for insanity, 141 intoxication is not as easy to
determine as the court assumed, 142 psychological and
psychiatric understandings of mental illnesses are nearly
forty years more developed, 143 and, as the David Sneed
illustration and Harvard report demonstrate, it is now clear
capital defendants are far from protected.
In other words, even if courts could implement S.B.
40’s proposal without incorporating diminished capacity
defenses, the bill’s passage should still override Wilcox
because it provides a remedy to the very problems the Ohio
Supreme Court overlooked and, thus, demonstrates it is
time for courts to put aside legal fictions and grapple with
the realities of mental illness. For as crucial a first step as
passing S.B. 40 is to the mentally ill who face the death
penalty, more is required to bring justice to the
overwhelming number of noncapital mentally ill defendants
who must choose between the rarely successful insanity
defense and the rarely helpful mitigation phase. 144
Criminal defendants with mental illnesses that
directly impaired their ability to think or act or make
decisions at the moment that they committed a crime
should be allowed to explain this to a jury who would
otherwise consider them “entirely sane” and judge them
according to the “reasonable person’s” neurotypical
See discussion supra note 2; cf. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 527 (“Having
satisfied ourselves that Ohio’s test for criminal responsibility adequately
safeguards the rights of the insane, we are disinclined to adopt an alternative
defense that could swallow up the insanity defense and its attendant
commitment provisions.”).
142 Vars, supra note 25, at 213 (arguing that diagnosing intoxication is not
straightforward because “diagnoses are usually made retrospectively”; data is
often self-reported due to unavailable blood, urine, or hair samples; and
drunk driving is the only crime defined by blood alcohol concentration,
meaning other crimes lack the ability to perfectly match level of intoxication
with ability to formulate intent because alcohol affects everyone differently);
Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 530 (“It takes no great expertise for jurors to determine
whether an accused was ‘ “so intoxicated as to be mentally unable to intend
anything (unconscious),” ’ whereas the ability to assimilate and apply the
finely differentiated psychiatric concepts associated with diminished capacity
demands a sophistication . . . that jurors (and officers of the court) ordinarily
have not developed.”) (citation omitted).
143 See Vars, supra note 25, at 213 (providing research of reliable psychiatric
diagnoses).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 20–22; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, DEATH
PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW PROJECT, SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE
DEATH PENALTY 1, 15 (Dec. 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/images/crsj/DPDPRP/SevereMentalIllnessandtheDeathPenalty_Whi
tePaper.pdf (stating that more than half of U.S. inmates—which would
represent both noncapital and capital defendants—have a mental health
diagnosis).
141
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standards. Furthermore, the State should not be able to
essentially assume the presence of a culpable mens rea
simply because a defendant does not plead insanity and
cannot offer their real reasons for lacking intent. Ensuring
fair trials for mentally ill defendants requires that Ohio
erase the bright lines of Wilcox and let the blurriness of
diminished capacity take its shape.
In 1980, an Ohio jury convicted Moses J. Wilcox of
aggravated burglary and aggravated murder despite
hearing psychiatrist Dr. Ramos’s expert testimony that he
had an I.Q. of sixty-eight, a mental age of twelve,
schizophrenia, and dyslexia; was psychotic, though not
“mentally ill” under the law; and was “susceptible to
following the instructions of an authority figure.” 145
Initially, the court found Wilcox to be incompetent to stand
trial, but after committing him to Lima State Hospital for
treatment for a few months, the court deemed his
competency restored. 146
Wilcox had accompanied Jesse Custom to the home
of their friend, Duane Dixon, ostensibly to buy
marijuana. 147 Conflicting evidence made it unclear whether
Wilcox and Custom broke into the home to burglarize it or
whether Dixon let them in, but within fifteen to thirty
minutes, witnesses heard gunshots and Dixon was dead. 148
Though Custom was the shooter, Ohio’s complicity statute
allowed a jury to convict Wilcox as if he were the principle
offender so long as the evidence proved that he aided or
abetted the commission of the crime with the same intent
required by the offense. 149 In other words, Wilcox’s entire
case came down to proving his criminal intent. Because he
could not use the truth of his cognitive disabilities and
mental illness to show the jury that there was reasonable
doubt as to his ability to form the requisite intent, he was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
CONCLUSION
Since 2006, the ABA—in conjunction with the
American Psychiatric Association, the American
Psychological Association, and the National Alliance on
Wilcox, 1981 WL 4959, at *6.
Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 523.
147 Wilcox, 1981 WL 4959, at *1–2.
148 Id.
149 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03(A)(2), (F) (West 2018).
145
146
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Mental Illness—has opposed the execution of individuals
with severe mental illness, based on the premise that
severe mental illness diminishes its victims’ capabilities
like insanity, intellectual disability, and youthfulness do. 150
As Justice Kennedy stated in Hall v. Florida, “The death
penalty is the gravest sentence our society may impose.
Persons facing that most severe sanction must have a fair
opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their
execution.” 151 Yet, in order to protect both capital and
noncapital mentally ill defendants, the law must go beyond
its focus on moral culpability in sentencing and stop
allowing courts to find legal culpability based on the
fictional idea of binary sanity.
S.B. 40 could not have helped Wilcox. The insanity
defense failed him. The legal fiction of binary sanity
convicted him. And mitigation did not prevent him from a
lifetime sentence in prison. The only way to truly resolve
the tension between what should have happened and what
did happen for Wilcox, Sneed, and many others, is to
overturn his case and allow both capital and noncapital
defendants the option to tell the jury the truth.

150 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 144, at 6 (“Although the ABA does not take a
position supporting or opposing the death penalty generally, its policy is
based largely on the rationale that the execution of people with severe mental
illness is inconsistent with our existing legal prohibitions on executing people
with intellectual disabilities or children under the age of 18.”).
151 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 724 (2014) (holding that Florida could not
define “intellectual disability” using a raw I.Q. test score alone).

